Thomas A. Paulsen Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, and Default Indemnity Fund of the Utah Industrial Commission : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Thomas A. Paulsen Company v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, and Default Indemnity Fund
of the Utah Industrial Commission : Brief of
Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Earl D. Tanner, Sr.; Brad L Englund; Tanner, Bowen, and Tanner; Attorneys for Petitioners.
Suzan Pixton; Attorney for Respondents.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Thomas A Paulsen Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, No. 198621049.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1521
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DR!SF 
UTAH 
DOCUwu ^ 
K F U 
45.9 
S9 
DOCKETS o^i 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS A. PA? ....-., 1, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and DEFAULT INDEMNITY 
FUND OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
WIPKKME COURT 
Case No. 2 104') 
Category Mo. 6 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Petition for Writ of Review from the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Worker's Compensation 
TANNEF 
EarJ i Tanner 
Brad L Snqlunc: 
10 20 Benef ici •:* 
o. 
s.. 
L I r. 
Street 
>w--r 
Suzan Pixton, Esq. 
160 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah fJi'i 
Attorney for Respondents 
'; )' I Y-or 
MAY 21986 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and DEFAULT INDEMNITY 
FUND OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
SUPREME COURT 
Case No. 21049 
Category No. 6 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
Petition for Writ of Review from the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Worker's Compensation 
Suzan Pixton, Esq. 
160 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
Earl D. Tanner, Sr. 
Brad L Enqlund 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Attorney for Respondents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i i 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 2 
Statement of Facts 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I. 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED BEYOND HIS 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN ISSUING THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
ORDER 9 
A. The Supplemental Order is invalid because 
a proper motion for review was not filed 
within the time required by Section 
35-1-8253 10 
B. The Supplemental Order is invalid because 
the Administrative Law Judge sought to 
review the final award of the commission 11 
C. The Supplemental Order is invalid because 
the requirement for exercising the 
continuing jurisdiction of the Commission 
were not met . . . . . 12 
POINT II. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS WITHOUT STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY TO ORDER THOMAS PAULSEN TO PAY MONEY 
DIRECTLY TO THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND 14 
POINT III. 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSION OF LAW UPON WHICH 
IT WAS BASED IS ERRONEOUS 15 
CONCLUSION 17 
INDEX TO ADDENDUM A 
ADDENDUM. A-l 
thru 
A-19 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES - UTAH 
Page 
Brkhakic v. Industrial Commission, 
63 Utah 582 227 P. 1036 (1924) 13 
Carter v. Industrial Commission, 
76 Utah 520, 290 P. 776 (1930) 13 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952 (1967). 13 
Piercey v. Civil Service Commission of Salt 
Lake City, 116 Utah 138, 208 P.2d 1123 (1949) 9 
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 
61 Utah 514, 215 P. 1047 (1923) 13 
CASES - OTHER 
Park Motel Corp. v. Kansas Department 
of Health and Environment, 234 Kan. 374, 
673 P.2d 1126 (1983) 9 
STATUTES 
35-1-58, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 , as amended 8 
35-1-70, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 17 
35-1-78, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 6,7,9,13,14 
35-1-82.52, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 3,6,7,10,12,15 
ii 
35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 7,9,10,11,12 
35-1-82.54, Utah Code Annotated, 
19 53, as amended 10 
35-1-82.55, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 , as amended 10,11 
35-1-83, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 12 
35-1-107, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended 7,8,15,16,17 
iii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAHf and DEFAULT INDEMNITY 
FUND OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
SUPREME COURT 
Case No. 21049 
Category No. 6 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1. Whether the Industrial Commission acted without or in 
excess of its statutory powers in issuing a 
Supplemental Order when an appropriate motion for 
review was not filed within the time period required by 
the Commission's enabling statute. 
ISSUE 2. Whether the Industrial Commission exceeded the 
authority granted in the enabling statute in ordering 
the petitioner to pay monies directly to the Default 
Indemnity Fund. 
ISSUE 3. Whether the Supplemental Conclusion of Law entered by 
the Industrial Commission in connection with the 
Supplemental Order is in accordance with established 
law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This case is an action for Workers' Compensation 
benefits before the Industrial Commission. The Administrative 
Law Judge Timothy C. Allen entered the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order on January 22, 1985 (R. 71, A-l). 
The Order did not require the petitioner Thomas A* Paulsen dba 
Thomas A. Paulsen Company to perform any act. After the 
statutory time for seeking review of the Order had elapsed, 
respondent Default Indemnity Fund requested, by means of an ex 
parte letter to the Administrative Law Judge, a Supplemental 
Order be issued (R. 76, A-6). 
Without notice or hearing, Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order were entered requiring by the 
Administrative Law Judge on October 8, 1985, Thomas A. Paulsen to 
pay certain sums directly to the Default Indemnity Fund (R. 77, 
A-7). Mr. Paulsen moved the Industrial Commission to review the 
Supplemental Order (R. 79, A-9), which motion was denied (R. 82, 
A-12). 
Mr. Paulsen filed a Petition for Writ of Review in 
this Court and moved for summary disposition. Respondents also 
moved for summary disposition. Both motions were denied. 
2. Statement of Facts. 
On April 1, 1984, David B. Paulsen was injured 
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while in the employ of Thomas A. Paulsen dba Thomas A. Paulsen 
Company (R. 71, A-l). David Paulsen did not tell his employer, 
Thomas Paulsen, of the injury until some two weeks after the 
accident (R. 36-37, A-17), nor did he seek medical attention 
until at least three weeks after the accident (R. 27-28, A-19). 
On August 1, 1984, David Paulsen filed an application for hearing 
seeking payment of medical bills and other compensation (R. 4, 
A-14). A hearing was held on October 12, 1984 with 
Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen presiding (R. 18, 
A-15). Both David Paulsen and Thomas Paulsen appeared pro se (R. 
18, A-15). 
On January 22, 1985, Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order were entered. In the Findings, the Judge set 
forth his determination that Thomas Paulsen "was uninsured for 
Workers' Compensation purposes" at the time of the injury (R. 
72, A-2). However, the Judge found that Thomas Paulsen had made 
good faith efforts to obtain Workers' Compensation insurance, but 
that through no fault of his own, he did not receive coverage (R. 
72, A-2). The Judge further determined that Thomas Paulsen was 
insolvent (R. 72-73, A-2 - A-3). Finally, the Judge found that 
David Paulsen was entitled to be compensated from the Default 
Indemnity Fund (R. 72, A-3). 
In accordance with Section 35-1-82.52, the Judge 
specified the amount of the compensation to be paid to David 
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Paulsen and ordered the Default Indemnity Fund ("the Fund") to 
pay the compensation (R. 73-74, A-3 - A-4). The Judge did not 
order Thomas Paulsen to pay any compensation to David Paulsen. 
Because of its pivotal importance, the Order is 
reproduced here in toto: 
"ORDER: 
"IT IS THEREFOR ORDERED that the Default 
Indemnity Fund prepare the necessary 
vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Fund, to pay to David B. 
Paulsen, compensation at the rate of 
$233.44 per week for 21 weeks or a total 
of $4,902.24, as temporary total 
disability for the period April 8, 1984 to 
and including September 1, 1984, resulting 
from the industrial injury of April 1, 
1984; said benefits to be paid in a lump 
sum. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default 
Indemnity Fund prepare the necessary 
vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Fund, to pay to David B. 
Paulsen compensation at the rate of 
$200.00 per week for 46.8 weeks or a total 
of $9,360.00, as compensation for a 15% 
permanent partial impairment resulting 
from the industrial injury of April 1, 
1984; said benefits to commence effective 
September 2, 1984, with accrued amounts 
due and owing in a lump sum. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default 
Indemnity Fund prepare the necessary 
vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Fund, to pay to David B. 
Paulsen, the sum of $6,804.49, which 
amount represents the medical expenses 
incurred by Mr. Paulsen as a result of the 
industrial injury of April 1, 1984; Mr. 
Paulsen is to pay the medical care 
providers listed in the Findings of Fact 
of this Order. 
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"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for 
Review of the foregoing shall be filed in 
writing within fifteen (15) days from the 
date hereof specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections and 
unless so filed this Order shall be final 
and not subject to review or appeal." (R. 
73-74, A-3 - A-4). 
None of the affected parties sought review of the 
Order within the 15-day time limit set forth in both the Order 
and the applicable statutes. In particular, Mr. Paulsen did not 
seek review because the Order had no effect on him. 
Eight months after the Order was entered, the 
Default Indemnity Fund sent an ex parte letter to the Judge 
requesting a Supplemental Order requiring Thomas Paulsen to repay 
the Fund the amounts it paid to David Paulsen (R. 76, A-6). In 
its letter the Fund made several misrepresentations concerning 
the original Order. Specifically, the Fund stated that the 
original Order required Thomas A. Paulsen Company to pay money to 
David Paulsen; and further, it stated that the Order granted the 
Default Indemnity Fund full rights of subrogation. Both 
representations were entirely false. 
On October 8, 1985 without giving notice or 
granting a hearing, the Administrative Judge acted upon the 
Fund's letter and issued Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order (R. 77, A-7). The Supplemental 
Order directed Thomas Paulsen to pay directly to the Default 
Indemnity Fund the amount paid by the Fund to David Paulsen. 
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On October 23, 1985, Thomas Paulsen brought a 
motion for review (R. 79, A-9) which was denied on November 8, 
1985 (R. 82, A-12). Thereafter, Mr. Paulsen filed a Petition for 
Writ of Review in this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There are three reasons why the Supplemental Order 
should be vacated: First, the Commission exceeded its statutory 
authority in issuing the Supplemental Order; second, the 
Commission exceeded statutory authority by ordering Thomas 
Paulsen to pay money directly to the Default Indemnity Fund; and 
third, the Commission based its Supplemental Order on an 
erroneous conclusion of law. 
For any action of the Industrial Commission to be 
valid, it must be authorized by statute. This is necessarily so 
because the Commission is an agency of statutory creation and has 
no common law powers. There is no authority for the type of 
Supplemental Order issued in this case. There are only two 
sections in the Worker's Compensation Act which authorize the 
Commission to render a Supplemental Order. The first is Section 
35-1-82.53 and the second is Section 35-1-78. 
Section 35-1-82.53 reguires as a condition precedent to 
a Supplemental Order that a proper Motion for Review be filed. 
In the present case, the Motion for Review, if one was filed, was 
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not filed within the 15 day time limit set forth in the statute 
and did not state in detail the errors sought to be reviewed. As 
a proper motion had not been filed, a Supplemental Order could 
not have been issued pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53. Moreover, 
under Section 35-1-82.52, the original order had become the final 
award of the Commission, and there is no statutory authority 
which would permit an Administrative Law Judge to review the 
final award of the Commission. However, that is what took place 
in this case. 
The only other authority for issuing a Supplemental 
Order is under the Commission's continuing jurisdiction granted 
in Section 35-1-78. However, this power cannot be used unless 
there is some change or new development not known at the time the 
original Order was entered. There was no showing, nor could 
there be, of a change or new development not known at that time. 
Therefore, the Commission could not invoke its continuing 
jurisdiction to authorize its actions. 
The second reason the Supplemental Order is invalid is 
that the Commission had no authority to require Thomas Paulsen to 
pay money directly to the Default Indemnity Fund. Section 
35-1-107 governs this issue and is clear. The Default Indemnity 
Fund's only right to reimbursement is the right of subrogation. 
Nowhere does the Code authorize the Commission to order the 
employer to pay reimbursement directly to the Default Indemnity 
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Fund, To the contrary, the Code requires the Fund to seek 
reimbursement through the Courts under Section 35-1-58. Because 
the Commission had no authority to order Paulsen to pay money 
directly to the Fund for reimbursement, the Supplemental Order 
must be vacated. 
Finally, the Supplemental Order is based solely upon a 
single erroneous conclusion of law. The Supplemental Conclusion 
of Law states that Paulsen was liable to pay the compensation 
benefits paid by the Fund because of Section 35-1-107. There is 
nothing in that section or any other section of the Worker's 
Compensation Act which would indicate that merely because the 
Fund was required to pay an award to an injured employee, that 
without more the award is the responsibility of the employee. 
There is no legal basis which would support the Supplemental 
Order. Therefore, the Supplemental Order should be set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
The Supplemental Order rendered by the Industrial 
Commission must be vacated as it is contrary to law. The 
Supplemental Order is invalid for three reasons: First, the 
Commission exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the 
Supplemental Order; second, the Commission exceeded its statutory 
authority in directing Thomas Paulsen to pay money directly to 
the Default Indemnity Fund; and third, the Supplemental Order is 
based upon an erroneous Conclusion of Law. Any one of the three 
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errors is sufficient to require the Supplemental Order to be 
vacated. 
POINT I 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED 
BEYOND HIS STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN 
ISSUING THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER. 
It is axiomatic that an administrative agency can only 
exercise those powers which are conferred upon it by statute. 
Piercey v. Civil Service Commission of Salt Lake Cityy 116 Utah 
138r 208 P.2d 1123 (1949). An agency of statutory creation has 
no general or common law powers. Park Motel Corp. v. Kansas 
Dept. of Health and Environment, 234 Kan. 374, 673 P.2d 1126 
(1983). Thus, in order for the Supplemental Order to have been 
valid, its issuance must necessarily have been authorized by 
statute. 
There are only two code sections which authorize an 
Administrative Judge of the Industrial Commission to issue a 
Supplemental Order. These are Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 
35-1-78. As will be shown below, neither section authorizes the 
Commission to issue the type of Supplemental Order which was 
issued in this case. As there is no authority for the issuance 
of the Supplemental Order, it must be vacated as being ultra 
vires. 
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A. The Supplemental Order is invalid because a proper 
motion for review was not filed within the time required by 
Section 35-1-82.53. 
Section 35-1-82.53 provides the only statutory 
authority for reviewing an order of an Administrative Law Judge. 
By its terms, a review of such an order is conditioned upon the 
proper filing of a motion for review. Section 35-1-82.55, 
U.C.A., provides the requirement which every motion for review 
must meet. First, any motion for review must "specify in detail 
the particular errors and objections" for which review is sought; 
and second, every motion for review "must be filed within fifteen 
days of the date of any order of the Administrative Law Judge or 
Commission.. . " 
The Order for which the Default Indemnity Fund 
sought review was dated January 22, 1985. By the terms of the 
Order, and by the language of Sections 35-1-82.52 and 35-1-82.55, 
the Order became the final award of the Commission on February 6, 
1985. The letter of the Default Indemnity Fund to the 
1 
Section 35-1-82.54 provides authority to review Supplemental 
Orders of an Administrative Law Judge, cases referred to the 
Commission by an Administrative Law Judge, as well as orders of 
the Commission. Section 35-1-83 provides the authority for 
review of awards of the Commission. Neither section provides for 
review of an order of an Administrative Law Judge. Review of 
such an order must be done under the procedures set forth in 
Section 35-1-82.53. 
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Administrative Law Judge reguesting a Supplemental Order, even if 
it can be construed as a motion for review, met neither of two 
above-stated reguirements of Section 35-1-82.55. First, it did 
not specify in detail the errors in the Order, or the objections 
thereto. Second, it was not filed within the fifteen days from 
the date of the Order, but rather was filed more than seven 
months after the Order became final. 
Section 35-1-82.53 reguires that a proper motion be 
filed before the Administrative Law Judge may issue a 
Supplemental Order. It is clear that a proper Motion for Review 
was not timely filed. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge 
was without statutory authority to enter the Supplemental Order. 
Thus the Order must be vacated as being ultra vires. 
B. The Supplemental Order is invalid because the 
Administrative Law Judge sought to review the final award of the 
Commission. 
The Supplemental Order issued by the Administrative 
Law Judge was ultra vires as it sought to review a final award of 
the Commission. An Administrative Law Judge is without statutory 
authority to review such an order. 
Section 35-1-82.53 sets forth the authority of the 
Administrative Law Judge to review orders. It is clear that he 
can review his own orders, but nowhere is there authority granted 
an Administrative Law Judge to review a final award of the 
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Commission. Once an order has become the final award of the 
Commission, the only statutory means of review is by filing an 
action in this Court under Section 35-1-83. 
The Order dated January 22, 1985 was a final award 
of the Commission. Section 35-1-82.52, Utah Code Annotated, 
provides that "[t]he Order of the Administrative Law Judge or 
Commission shall be the final award of the Commission unless a 
petition for review is filed as provided in Section 35-1-82.53." 
As shown above, a timely petition for review was not filed within 
the requirements of Section 35-1-82.53. The Order dated January 
22, 1985 became the final award of the Commission of February 6, 
1985. 
Inasmuch as the Order which the Fund sought to 
review was the final award of the Commission, the Administrative 
Law Judge was without statutory authority to review it. 
Therefore, the Supplemental Order was ultra vires and should be 
vacated. 
C. The Supplemental Order is invalid because the 
requirements for exercising the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Commission were not met. 
As pointed out above, the Order dated January 22, 
1985 became the final award of the Commission on February 6, 
1985. Thereafter, it could only be reviewed by this Court or 
modified by the Commission under its powers of continuing 
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jurisdiction granted in Section 35-1-78. However, it is clear 
that the Commission's continuing jurisdiction could not be 
invoked in this type of case. 
The purpose of Section 35-1-78 is to provide the 
Commission with the ability to make changes in previous orders 
because of changed circumstances. The "continuing jurisdiction 
and latitude was no doubt given for the express purpose 
suggested,...to avoid the making of excessive or inadeguate 
awards in doubtful and complicated cases..." Carter v. 
Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 520, 290 P. 776, 782 (1930). 
However, the section "was not intended to authorize the 
Commission to resume jurisdiction of a case that has already been 
determined, unless there has been some change or new development 
not previously known." Brkhakic v. Industrial Commission, 63 
Utah 582, 227 P. 1036, 1038 (1924). 
The law has been consistent from the time the rule 
was laid down in the bedrock case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial 
Commission, 61 Utah 514, 215 P. 1047 (1923) until the present. 
Unless there is some change (whether that is in the injury or 
otherwise) from the time the final Order was rendered, the 
Commission cannot invoke its continuing jurisdiction. Kennecott 
Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 
952 (1967). 
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There has not been, nor can there be, any showinq 
of a change that would permit the Commission to evoke its 
jurisdiction under Section 35-1-78. Therefore, the Supplemental 
Order could not have been issued pursuant to that section. The 
Supplemental Order was therefore ultra vires, and should be 
vacated. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS 
WITHOUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ORDER 
THOMAS PAULSEN TO PAY MONEY DIRECTLY 
TO THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND. 
As stated above, the Industrial Commission has no 
authority except that granted by statute. Any action taken by 
the Commission which is not authorized by statute is invalid. In 
adopting and affirming the Supplemental Order the Industrial 
Commission exceeded its statutory authority. 
In granting the Default Indemnity Fund's request for a 
Supplemental Order, the Administrative Law Judge ordered Thomas 
Paulsen to: 
"...pay the Default Indemnity Fund of the Utah 
Industrial Commission, the sum of $21,002.63, 
for benefits heretofore paid by the Fund on 
behalf of Thomas A. Paulsen Company to David 
B. Paulsen for the industrial injury he 
sustained on April 1, 1984." (R. 77, A-7.) 
There is nothing in the Workers' Compensation Act which 
would authorize the Commission to order an employer to pay money 
directly to the Default Indemnity Fund for the purpose of 
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reimbursing the Fund for benefits it paid to the injured 
employee. To the contrary, the language applicable to the issue 
is found in Section 35-1-107(3) which states: 
"(3) To the extent of the compensation and 
other benefits paid or payable to an employee 
or their dependents from the Default Indemnity 
Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the 
rights, powers, and benefits of the employee 
or their dependents against the employer 
failing to make compensation payments." 
The statute is clear, the Fund only has rights of subrogation. 
Had the legislature intended the Commission to have the 
authority to order an employer to reimburse the Fund directly, it 
would have added language similar to that found in subsection (8) 
of that same section: 
"...and [the Commission] shall direct the 
additional penalty to be paid into the Fund." 
The legislature did not grant the Industrial Commission 
the authority it sought to execute by ordering Thomas Paulsen to 
pay money directly to the Fund. Because there is no statutory 
basis which would support the Supplemental Order, it must be 
vacated as being ultra vires. 
POINT III 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER MUST BE 
VACATED BECAUSE THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
CONCLUSION OF LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS 
BASED IS ERRONEOUS. 
Section 35-1-82.52 requires that if compensation 
benefits are granted to the claimant, "the order shall 
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specify.>.by whom and to whom such benefits shall be paid..." 
(Emphasis added.) In accordance with this, in its original 
order, the Commission ordered the Default Indemnity Fund to pay 
David Paulsen compensation benefits. The Commission did not 
order Thomas Paulsen to pay any amount to David Paulsen. 
In granting the Fund's request for a Supplemental 
Order, the Commission entered the following Conclusion of Law: 
"Pursuant to Section 35-1-107, the [Workers' 
Compensation benefits paid to David Paulsen by 
the Default Indemnity Fund] were and are the 
responsibility of the uninsured employer..." 
This Conclusion of Law is erroneous. There is nothing 
in Section 35-1-107 which would indicate that merely because the 
Default Indemnity Fund paid an award to the employee, the award 
is the responsibility of the employer. The only language in 
Section 35-1-107 which gives rights of reimbursement to the Fund 
against the employer is that found in subsection (3). In that 
subsection, the legislature granted the Fund, by subrogation, all 
the rights, powers, and benefits of an employee against the 
employer failing to make compensation payments. 
Therefore, by its terms, Section 35-1-107 grants no 
rights of reimbursement to the Fund unless employee would have 
rights against the employer, or in other words, unless the order 
granting compensation from the Fund also required the employer to 
pay the compensation. A reading of the original Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order demonstrates that the 
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Administrative Law Judge felt the employer to be liable only if 
other sources of funds were not available. Because there were no 
personal funds available from Paulsen and because there were 
funds available from the Default Indemnity Fundf the Judge 
concluded that the employer was not liable. The Judge apparently 
concluded that under the present facts the Default Indemnity Fund 
was to act in a manner similar to the manner in which the Special 
Fund operates when additional benefits are granted under Section 
35-1-70. 
Inasmuch as the original Order did not order Thomas 
Paulsen to pay compensation benefits, the employee has no rights 
against him. Therefore, Section 35-1-107 does not make the 
benefits the responsibility of Thomas Paulsen. Thus the 
conclusion is erroneous. 
Because the Supplemental Order was premised on an 
erroneous conclusion of law, it should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should vacate the Supplemental Order of the 
Industrial Commission dated October 8, 1985. Such action is 
necessary for three reasons: First, the Administrative Law Judge 
and the Commission were without statutory authority to review or 
modify a prior final award of the Commission under the facts of 
this case; second, the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Commission were without statutory authority to order Thomas 
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Paulsen to pay money directly to the Default Indemnity Fund for 
the purpose of reimbursement; and third, the sole legal 
conclusion upon which the Supplemental Order was based is 
erroneous, leaving no legal support for the Supplemental Order, 
Since the Industrial Commission is an agency of statutory 
creation, it must look to its enabling legislation for authority. 
If there is no statutory authority or legal basis for an order of 
the Industrial Commission, the Order must be vacated as being 
ultra vires. Such is the case at bar. 
*—~ day of May, 1986. 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
By 
At t firmed—for^ Pe t i 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
If the undersigned, hereby certify that on the ^ 
day of May, 1986, I caused four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing PETITIONER'S BRIEF to be served on Respondents by 
hand delivering the same to:: 
Suzan P ix ton , Esq. 
160 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondents 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 84000663 
DAVID B. PAULSEN, * 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
THOMAS A PAULSEN CO. * 
(uninsured) * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 12, 
198A at 10:00 a.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: David B. Paulsen, PRO SE. 
Thomas A. Paulsen, PRO SE 
At the conclusion of the Evidentiary Hearing, the medical issue was 
submitted to the medical panel for its evaluation. The medical panel report 
was received by the Commission and copies were distributed to the parties. 
Fifteen (15) days having elapsed since the mailing of said medical panel 
report, and no objections having been received thereto the medical panel 
report is admitted into evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein sustained an industrial injury on April 1, 1984 
while employed by the defendant, Thomas Paulsen, general contractor. On that 
date, he was helping with the cementing of a roof of a building under 
construction. In order to accomplish this task, Mr, Paulsen was required to 
pull 5 gallon buckets of cement approximately 14 feet from the ground up to 
the roof, by using a rope on the bucket. The rope had a series of knots in 
it, which the applicant would use to pull the bucket up to the top of the 
roof. He was accomplishing this task by bending down on his knees and 
reaching down over the edge of the roof. While he was so engaged, he felt a 
pull in his neck, which he did not pay too much attention to, since as a 
carpenter he had experienced various pulls before. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
A-l 
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He reported to work for approximately a week after the injury or 
until April 7, 198A. Thereafter, Mr. Paulsen reported to the Holladay 
Chiropractic Clinic for chiropractic treatment. After receiving x-rays and 
adjustments from Dr. Van Slooten, he was referred to Dr. Robert Morrow. Dr. 
Morrow saw the applicant on May 1, 1984 and immediately had him admitted to 
the St. Mark's Hospital for neck surgery. The applicant being hesitant about 
surgery, requested a second opinion which he received from Dr. Robert Lamb. 
Or. Lamb agreed with the need for surgery, and on May 7, 1984 excised the C5 
md C6 disc from the applicant's neck, and also performed a two level fusion. 
The applicant was told to remain off work for three months, and was released 
to return to work on or about September 1, 1984, by Dr. Lamb. Mr. Paulsen has 
lince returned to work and has not had any further problems with his neck. 
The applicant denied any prior problems with his neck. 
The case was referred to a medical panel for a determination of the 
permanent partial impairment. The medical panel found that the applicant has 
sustained a 15% permanent partial impairment of the whole body due to the 
industrial injury of April 1, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge adopts the 
findings of the medical panel as his own. 
As a result of this injury, the applicant has sustained the following 
medical expenses: 
Dr. Lamb $1,445.00 
Dr. Morrow 312.00 
Dr. Peters 437.00 
St. Mark's Hospital 3,731.25 
Diagnostic Radiology 164,30 
Medications 330.54 
Dr. Van Slooten 384.40 
Total $6,804.49 
These expenses are the responsibility of the employer, since the 
employer was uninsured for workers* compensation purposes at the time of the 
industrial injury. However, some mention should be made of the situation 
surrounding the defendant being uninsured. The file contains information 
indicating that Mr. Thomas Paulsen,, the employer, in good faith made efforts 
to obtain workers' compensation coverage on February 23, 1984 from a Rogers 
Insurance Inc., P.O. Box 725, Provo, Ut. When the applicant tried to make a 
claim with American States Insurance, he was advised that no policy for 
insurance had been issued. Rather, it appeared that the insurance agent, 
Rogers Insurance Inc., absconded with the employer's funds and did not 
purchase the coverage. The Administrative Law Judge was advised by the 
Insurance Department of the State of Utah, that Rogers Insurance is defunct 
and judgement proof. Upon taking testimony from the employer, it was 
determined by the Administrative Law Judge that the employer was in no 
position to pay the medical bills or the compensation benefits due in this 
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matter, for the reason that for all practical purposes the employer is 
insolvent. Accordingly, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
provisions of Section 35-1-107, regarding the Default Indemnity Fund have been 
triggered such that David B. Paulsen is entitled to an award from the Default 
Indemnity Fund for the injuries he has sustained as a result of his industrial 
injury. 
On April 1, 1984 the applicant was earning $8.00 per hour working 40 
hours per week and was married with three minor dependent children, which 
entitles him to temporary total disability benefits in the amount of $233.44 
per week and permanent partial impairment benefits in the amount of $200.00 
per week, which is the statutory maximum. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
David B. Paulsen is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for 
the industrial injury he sustained on April 1, 1984, which accident arose out 
of or during the course of his employment with the defendant, Thomas A. 
Paulsen, (uninsured). 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Default Indemnity Fund prepare the 
necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Fund, to 
pay to David B. Paulsen, compensation at the rate of $233.44 per week for 21 
weeks or a total of $4,902.24, as temporary total disability for the period 
April 8, 1984 to and including September 1, 1984, resulting from the 
industrial injury of April 1, 1984; said benefits to be paid in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default Indemnity Fund prepare the 
necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Fund, to 
pay to David B. Paulsen, compensation at the rate of $200.00 per week for 46.8 
weeks or a total of $9,360.00, as compensation for a 15% permanent partial 
impairment resulting from the industrial injury of April 1, 1984; said 
benefits to commence effective September 2, 1984, with accrued amounts due and 
owing in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Default Indemnity Fund prepare the 
necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Fund, to 
pay to David B. Paulsen, the sum of $6,804.49, which amount represents the 
medical expenses incurred by Mr. Paulsen as a result of the industrial injury 
of April 1, 1984; Mr. Paulsen is to pay the medical care providers listed in 
the Findings of Fact of this Order. 
a-*} 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days from the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
lien 
ive Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utat 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this^ffi^day of January, 1985, 
ATTEST: 
^Linda J. St^4sburg, Commissi^ ^ Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on January (Xc^ . 1984 a copy of the attached 
ORDER was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage 
paid: 
Default Indemnity Fund 
Thomas A. Paulsen 
4708 Bronbreck Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
David B. Paulsen 
1789 Ski View Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
St- Mark's Hospital 
Attn: Lawrence Chinn 
1200 East 3900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Dr. Jim Van Slooten 
3424 South 2300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dr. Jeffrey Peters 
P.O. Box 346 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Dr. Robert Morrow 
1220 East 3900 South Suite 4J 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Dr. Robert Lamb 
1220 East 3900 South, Suite 4J 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Diagnostic Radiology Physicians 
1141 East 3900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Sherry 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
NORMAN H. HANGF.RTI:R. <.<IVIR\O« STFPHFN M HNDIIVOIMHMW 
" • \ I ! I H 7 -\Xf-.!*"i-\RI) COMV.SMO' \.l 
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September 20, 1985 
Judge Timothy C. Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Dear Judge Allen, 
On January 22, 1985, you issued an Order requiring that Thomas A. Paulsen 
Co., pay David B. Paulsen certain sums of money representing Workers' 
Compensation benefits as a result of his industrial accident. 
You also made a finding that the employer was insolvent, and ordered that 
the Default Indemnity Fund pay those benefits with full rights of subrogation. 
Pursuant to your Order, the fund has made payment in this matter totalling 
$21,002.63 and respectfully requests that you issue a Supplemental Order 
requiring that Thomas A. Paulsen pay the fund this same sum. With your 
Supplemental Order, the fund can then abstract your award for the purpose of 
docketing it as a judgment. 
Your attention and consideration in this matter would be greatly 
appreciated. 
Very truly yours, 
'Suzan Pixton 
Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund 
C-
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 84000663 
DAVID B. PAULSEN, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY 
(UNINSURED), 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
On January 22, 1985, the Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the above-entitled matter, ordering the 
Default Indemnity Fund of the Industrial Commission of Utah to pay temporary 
total compensation benefits, medical expenses, and permanent partial 
impairment benefits to David B. Paulsen, as a result of an industrial injury 
he sustained on April 1, 1984, while employed by the Defendant, Thomas A. 
Paulsen Company, (Uninsured). After taking the testimony of the Defendant, 
the Administrative Law Judge determined that the Defendant was practically 
insolvent, and accordingly, ordered the Default Indemnity Fund to pay the 
Applicant benefits. As a result of that Order, the Default Indemnity Fund has 
paid David B. Paulsen, $21,002.63, in worker's compensation benefits. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-107, the foregoing worker's compensation 
benefits were and are the responsibility of the uninsured employer, Thomas A. 
Paulsen Company. Pursuant to Section 107, the Default Indemnity Fund has full 
rights of subrogation against the uninsured Defendant Employer, Thomas A. 
Paulsen Company. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Thomas A. Paulsen Company pay the 
Default Indemnity Fund of the Utah Industrial Commission, the sum of 
$21,002.63, for benefits heretofore paid by the Fund on behalf of Thomas A. 
Paulsen Company to David B. Paulsen for the industrial injury he sustained on 
April 1, 1984. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/ - _day of October, 1985. 
ATTEST: 
/ s / Linda J . Strasburg 
CTTTcrar~J~. s t r a s B u r g 
Commission Secretary 
****** 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on October , 1985, a copy of the ^ttached 
Supplemental Order in the case of David B. Paulsen issued October * — 1985, 
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
David B. Paulsen, 1789 Ski View Drive, Sandy, UT 84092 
Thomas A. Paulsen Company, 4 708 BronBreck Drive, SLC, UT 84117 
Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By ^f/,/ ^ — ^ 
Wilma 
A-ft 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 84000663 
DAVID 8. PAULSEN, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY, 
DEFENDANT. 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Defendant, Thomas A. Paulsen, dba Thomas A. Paulsen 
Comany, by and through his attorneys, moves the Industrial 
Commission of Utah as follows: 
1. To review the Supplemental Order issued in the 
above case on October 8, 1985, and vacate the same, or in the 
event the motion to vacate is denied, 
2. To reopen the case for taking of further evidence 
and to make further findings of fact to determine whether the 
defendant Paulsen was, in fact, entitled to be treated as an 
employer who was insured by a private carrier. 
Defendant Paulsen asserts that the administrative law 
judge was without statutory authority to modify, supplement, or 
in any fashion alter the original Order dated January 22, 1985. 
Section 35-1-82.52, U.C.A., provides that an order of 
an administrative law judqe "shall be the final award of the 
commission unless a petition for review is filed as provided in 
35-1-82.53." Section 35-1-82.53, U.C.A., provides the only 
statutory authority for issuing a supplemental order.
 : '
;,hfafe ': 
section provides a supplemental order can be rendered after the 
filing of a motion for review. Its wording appears to compel the 
conclusion that a motion for review is a condition precedent to a 
supplemental order. Section 35-1-82.55 provides that every 
motion for review must be filed within fifteen days of the date 
of the Order. The time period for filing a motion to review the 
January 22, 1985 Order ended on February 6r 1985. The Default 
Indemnity Fund of the Utah Industrial Commission filed its Motion 
for Review on September 24, 1985. The original Order dated 
Janury 22/ 1985 became the final award of the Commission on 
February 6, 1985, and thereafter, the administrative law judge 
was without statutory authority to modify it. The Supplemental 
Order must be vacated as it is ultra vires. 
Should the Commission determine that the administrative 
law judge acted within his statutory authority, then the 
Commission is authorized by Section 35-1-82.54 to review the 
entire record and to make further findings of fact. Defendant 
Paulsen asserts that he was, by virtue of his conduct and the 
legal obligation incumbent on the private insurer, insured at the 
time the industrial accident took place. Therefore, the sums 
paid to applicant as compensation benefits are not the 
responsibility of defendant. Defendant Paulsen further asserts 
that Section 35-1-107, U.C.A., does not provide that the workers' 
compensation benefits were and are the responsibility ov Thomas 
A. Paulsen Company. 
Dated this 23rd day of October, 1985. 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
Attorneys—tor Det^ ftdarn 
1020 Beneficia^Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 538-2021 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 23rd day of October, 1985, a copy 
of the foregoing Motion for Review was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to: 
David B. Paulsen 
1789 Ski View Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Susan Pixton 
Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 84000663 
DAVID B. PAULSEN, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY 
(UNINSURED), 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
DENIAL OF 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
On or about October 8, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about October 23, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Defendant by and through his attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of October 8, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
€-'' day of November, 1985. 
ATTEST 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
^^J^-
Linda J. Str^sSurg /7\ 
Commission Secretary c/ 
Walter T. Axelgard 
Commissioner 
Lenic^e L. Nielsen 
CfoU UUttiUSSSUUJIUMSr 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on November /*- ' . 1985, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion for Review in the case of David B. Paulsen, issued 
November )<t ^1985, was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
David B. Paulsen, 1789 Ski View Drive, Sandy, UT 84092 
Thomas A. Paulsen Company, 4 709 BronBeck Drive, SLC, UT 84117 
Brad Englund, Atty., 1020 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State 
Street, SLC, UT 84111 
Suzan Pixton, Administrator, Default Indemnity Fund 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By. - : ~ ^ / . 
Wilma 
, IN OLACK INK INDUSTRrAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
560 SOUTH 300 EAST 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
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A P P L I C A T I O N F O R H E A R I N G 
iV*'r s insurance Company 
» Blank if not known) 
MANT ALLEGES: 
^-sustained an injury by~accident arisinq out ofy or in the course of employment w i th the^Defendant [Employer) onyt l 
V fit day of UfAffr . 1 9 . & H - at £ ^ < T ^ V . ^^1T) ^ " ^ Z - « C , / / J 
—-' I O' i»11ori City iyui Stntf . 
The accident occurred as fol lows: (Give a br«ief description of the facts) J;'J. y/j^^ijf , ^ > ^ 
Hj^hA^uO^ ctfMJ ^ The parts of the body injured and the subsequent results ai 
1
 l i i ' t o f f w o r k ) ( ( I n t o r n t u r m»<l) 
The injury caused temporary total disabil ity f rom ^ p ^ f f i L ,
 amam IKJ 
^*~7m!ntr !n( da r t rncd )
A/ofe List additional periods of lost time from work due to this accident on the other side. 
If compensation has been paid for the above period (si, indicate weekly amount, period of time paid and date of last paymen 
This Clajjp is filed because: (Please Kl appropriate box I 
A. PfiDefendants have refused payment of only medical expenses. 
B. i ^upmpensat ion has not been paid for time off wo ik .is shown tn question 4 above. 
C. l#L)ek*ndants \ta\fv f i rmed l iabil i ty forporrrwnent partial disability/? I) */!/}*
 A , / , . , A 
D. x^Lr^n V&jLisdiLCr JAAMX paid euuMf JbdUw / A * 6 * W < ^ 
E. I am claiming addit ionar lemporary total disabil ity ^T, additional medical benefits (fckr"""' additional permanent parti 
disability G . ._ ) >» 
My date of birth is z [ Waqe at the date of injut y w |{ Month) (day) 
.hours per wee 
i l i  jtw>ar) 
^ 0 ^ ,™ AA&tXX) working ULI_MGL 
e ' h m n (li«v. w«' was not) married and had ^ 2 children under aqe 18 (Jependent upon me for suppoi 
Hbf-UHh, I hereby request that a time and place be fixed f c hearing or other appropriate proceeding before an Administrate 
Judge of the Commission and that an Awaid be made granting such relief or disposition as the Commission may have the pow 
int. 
, , * Y B E F 0 R E SIGNING READ DIRECTIONS OD/THE FtCVEKSE SM^E*** 
If representee/by counsel complete the fo l lowing: M in ,o f Arni^am iniinrnci) . ~K 
I of Attorney tt-"-.n ,tvi i Signature of C la imant* * Certifies thot Claimant has reatl directions 
reverse side. 
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n;m d m (
i r ju u o —«, 
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ORIGINAL 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 8400066 3 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
DAVID B. PAULSEN, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* REPORT OF ffFARINC 
vs, * 
* 
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY * 
(UNINSURED), * 
* 
Defendant. * 
* 
£ l £ £ i i J i i i i l i L 1 ll i H 1 £. H L L T 
HeaririK held in the Hearing Hoom of the .Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, October 1?, 19 8 H, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.: same being 
pursuant to Order and Notice uf the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. 
Before TIMOTHY C. ALLEN, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: 
The Appl i can t Da v i d B . Pau 1 sen was presen t , 
not represented by counsel. 
'The Defendant Thomas A. Paulsen was present, 
not represented by counsel. 
David B. Paulsen 
Thomas. A. Paulsen 
.1 N 1) \ : x 
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10. 
Q Uh-huh. 
A But I think the next day we swept the building 
out and just-- You know. Back to the usual work. Arid the 
stiffness-- I've had pulled muscles where it's, you know-
When you work carpenter work and you have a pulled muse Je 
you can't take time off. You get laid off. So you just 
work your way through it. You know. I just worked my — 
I just kept working and itfd get a little stiffer and a 
little stiffer and a little stiffer. And, you know, by the, 
oh, I guess the 5th or the 6th or the 7th of April I was 
losing my strength in my right arm, 
0 Uh-huh. 
A Now I have a doctor's report, if you want to read 
it. You probably already have copies. 
Q Okay. 
Wow who was the--
So when did you first get medical treatment then? 
A I'd have to go get my--
0 Go get it. 
Let's see. You were going to tell me who you saw for 
medical treatment? 
A Yeah. I saw-- I went and saw-- Well, I went to 
a chiropractor first. 
Q And what day was that? If you can remember? 
A Oh, that was within the first ten days of April. 
*te^f 
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me to the 
Q 
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Q 
And who was it. you .saw? 
No-- Excuse rne. It wa;; at the end of A 
Okay. 
It was at the end of April. 
Who did you see? 
I don't remember' the doctor's name. It w; 
Chiropractic Clinic. 
Isn't that Dr. Van Slooten? 
Yeah. Dr. Van Slooten. Night. 
Okay. 
And I went to see him every day for about 
Did he take any X-rays? 
Yes. He took X-rays. 
Okay. 
And then he recommended-- After five days 
ed that I go see |)r . Morrow. 
Dr. Robert; Morrow? 
Yes . 
So did you go .•:<•»> him? 
Yes. And the day that 1 saw Dr. Morrow he 
hospital that same day. 
Wow was that May 1st? 
I'm not sure. I think May 1st was the--
Mow you saw Dr. Morrow or — 
> r i 1 . 
is the 
f ive 
then he 
ad mi ttedj 
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t h a t you and I p e r f o r m e d ? 
A I t was m o s t l y s w e e p i n g , w a s n ' t i t ? 
0 W e l l , d i d we p l a c e t h e l e d g e r ( ? ) around t h e r o o f ? 
The n a i l i n g l e d g e r ? 
A Y e s . Y e s , we d i d . 
Q And how did we get almost—well, close to 700 
lineal feet of two-by-eight on the roof? 
A We pulled it up on the roof. 
0 By hand, didn't we? 
A Yes. 
Q And we carried it, and we placed it? 
A Yeah. 
Q Right. 
1 have a question, David-- I can't agree or disagree 
with what you say, because your1 body isn't my body. But, 
when this occurred, why did you not tell me that you had 
been injured? 
A Well, because, for one thing I^m not a cry-baby. 
!0kay? And every job I've ever worked for, [ mean I've had so 
tunny smashed fingers and pu.lled muscles that I eouJdn't 
Lount them. You know. I've had pulled muscles on jobs every 
[job I've ever worked on I've pulled a muscle or' felt Like 
I've broken my back or-- You know. This was just something 
(that just seemed to get worse and worse and worse and worse 
end worse. And it got worse in the hospital also. 
#^P 
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Q As we parted company on March 30th, as 1 recall we 
did that very amiably? 
A Yes. 
0 And at that time it was my feeling — correct me if 
I'm wrong — that you were feeling reasonably healthy? In 
that, as I observed, you w-vre walking upright, and you seemed 
to have the full facility oV your body? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. 
1 just wanted to make sure 1 was right on that. 
Did I not call you on or about April 1ljth to find out 
about your' injury? 
A Yeah. Yeah, I remember you stated that you didn't 
know that I had been injured until somebody told you at our 
mother 's funeral. 
0 Yes. That's right . 
Did I — 
A At that time I was. still hoping-- And I have an 
uncle, Chris, that [ talked to at the graves!te,
 Hnd I sajd, 
"Chris, we ought to go golfing sometime," I said, "as .••.oori n; 
L' get rid of this kink in my neck." You know. Because it--
Kven at that time 1 thought, you know, that it would go away. 
Q Yeah. 
That was at Mother's funeral on the Ulth?' 
A Yes. 
